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RESPONDING TO THE AMBIGUITY OF MILLER v. ALABAMA: 
THE TIME HAS COME FOR STATES TO LEGISLATE FOR A 
JUVENILE RESTORATIVE JUSTICE SENTENCING REGIME 
COURTNEY AMELUNG∗ 
Between the late 1970s and 1990s, the criminal justice system in 
the United States became increasingly punitive, as a movement to 
restructure the sentencing process and increase sentence severity took 
hold.1  The prior “rehabilitative ideal” fell apart and was replaced by 
an ideology that emphasized incapacitation and retribution as 
primary goals of criminal sentencing.2  This shift toward a punitive 
ideal influenced not only the treatment of adult offenders but also 
juvenile offenders.3  States enacted “tough on crime” policies in 
response to concerns that the juvenile justice system was unable to 
effectively address violent youth crime.4  One such policy permitted 
states to lower the minimum age at which an adult court could 
exercise jurisdiction over a juvenile.5  Consequently, some juveniles 
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 1.  Sara Sun Beale, Still Tough on Crime? Prospects for Restorative Justice in the United 
States, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 413, 413–14. 
 2.  Id. at 414.  Prior to its demise, the theory of rehabilitation dominated our nation’s 
criminal justice system, receiving nearly unanimous support from criminal justice 
professionals.  Stephen D. Sowle, A Regime of Social Death: Criminal Punishment in the Age of 
Prisons, 21 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 497, 498 (1995).  Commencing in the 1970s, 
however, these professionals, as well as the greater public, increasingly viewed 
rehabilitation as an impossible feat that rarely produced desired results (such as 
recidivism).  Id. at 498–99. 
 3.  Beale, supra note 1, at 415.  This shift was partly a result of policymakers’ 
prediction that “juvenile superpredators” were on the brink of committing massive violent 
crime throughout the nation.  James Traub, The Criminals of Tomorrow, NEW YORKER, Nov. 
4, 1996, at 50.  Such crime never occurred, however, and the superpredator theory was 
ultimately deemed inaccurate.  JODY KENT LAVY, JUVENILE JUSTICE INFO. EXCH., IN THE 
WAKE OF MILLER V. ALABAMA, STATES SHOULD RETHINK HOW TO HOLD YOUTHFUL 
OFFENDERS ACCOUNTABLE (2012), available at http://jjie.org/wake-of-miller-v-alabama-
states-should-rethink-how-hold-youthful-offenders-accountable/91413. 
 4.  Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 43, Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012) (No. 
10-9647), 2012 WL 523347. 
 5.  Id.  At the end of the 1999 legislative session, twenty-three states and the District of 
Columbia had at least one statutory provision that did not specify a minimum age at which 
a juvenile could be transferred to an adult court.  Sixteen states set the minimum age at 
fourteen, with the remaining states falling within the spectrum of ten and fifteen years of 
age.  OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
STATISTICAL BRIEFING BOOK, available at 
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convicted of homicide in adult court became subject to the 
mandatory life-without-parole sentences imposed by twenty-eight 
states and the federal government.6  In the United States, more than 
2,500 individuals are serving life-without-parole sentences for 
homicides they committed as juveniles.7  More than 2,000 of those 
individuals were sentenced under a mandatory sentencing regime.8 
In Miller v. Alabama,9 the United States Supreme Court held 
unconstitutional a sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison 
without parole for juvenile homicide offenders.  The Court’s decision 
involved the consolidated cases of Miller v. State10 and Jackson v. State.11  
In each case, a fourteen-year-old was convicted of murder and 
sentenced to a mandatory term of life without parole pursuant to a 
state criminal statute specifying such punishment.12 
In Jackson v. State, petitioner Kuntrell Jackson and two other boys 
went to a video store to commit a robbery.13  On the way to the store, 
Jackson became aware that one of the boys was carrying a sawed-off 
shotgun in his coat sleeve.14  Jackson remained outside of the store for 
most of the robbery, but entered before one of his co-conspirators 
shot and killed the store clerk.15  Jackson was charged as an adult, and 
a jury found him guilty of capital felony murder and aggravated 
robbery.16  The judge imposed a statutorily mandated sentence of life 
imprisonment without parole.17  After the Arkansas Supreme Court 
affirmed his conviction, Jackson filed a petition for a writ of habeas 
corpus, arguing that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments 
                                                        
http://ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/structure_process/qa04105.asp?qaDate=20020425& 
text= (last visited Apr. 17, 2013). 
 6.  Brett Kendall, Justices Reject Required Life Sentences for Juveniles, WALL ST. J., June 26, 
2012, at A6. 
 7.  U.S. Supreme Court Bans Mandatory Life Without Parole for Youth, NAT’L CTR. FOR 
YOUTH LAW, 
http://www.youthlaw.org/juvenile_justice/6/us_supreme_court_bans_mandatory_ 
life_without_parole_for_youth/ (last visited Feb. 11, 2013). 
 8.  Id.  
 9.  132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012).  
 10.  Miller v. State, 63 So. 3d 676 (Ala. Crim. App. 2010), rev’d, Miller v. Alabama, 132 
S. Ct. 2455 (2012). 
 11.  Jackson v. State, 194 S.W.3d 757 (Ark. 2004), rev’d sub nom. Miller v. Alabama, 132 
S. Ct. 2455. 
 12.  Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2461–63. 
 13.  Jackson, 194 S.W.3d at 758.  
 14.  Id.   
 15.  Id. at 758–59.   
 16.  Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2461. 
 17.  Id.; ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-104(b) (West 1997). 
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prohibit the mandatory sentencing of life without parole for juveniles 
fourteen years of age or younger.18  The circuit court dismissed 
Jackson’s petition, and the Supreme Court of Arkansas affirmed on 
the grounds that a life-without-parole sentence is not unconstitutional 
when imposed pursuant to a state statute.19 
In Miller v. State, petitioner Evan Miller and his friend, after a 
night of drinking and drug use, savagely beat Miller’s neighbor and 
set his trailer on fire, killing the neighbor.20  Miller was initially 
charged as a juvenile, but the District Attorney sought, and the court 
granted, removal of the case to adult court.21  A jury found Miller 
guilty of murder in the course of arson.22  The trial court imposed a 
statutorily mandated minimum punishment of life without parole.23  
The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed, holding that the 
sentence was not disproportionate in comparison to the crime 
committed, and that its mandatory nature was permissible under the 
Eighth Amendment.24 
Both Miller and Jackson filed a petition for certiorari with the 
Supreme Court, asserting two constitutional challenges to their 
sentences: (1) that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments 
categorically prohibit sentencing fourteen-year-olds to life without the 
possibility of parole, and (2) that the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments prohibit the imposition of life without the possibility of 
parole under a mandatory sentencing scheme that does not consider 
the offender’s age or other mitigating evidence.25 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and held that the 
mandatory imposition of life-without-parole sentences for juveniles 
convicted of homicide violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition 
of cruel and unusual punishment.26  The Court reasoned that a 
                                                        
 18.  Jackson v. Norris, 378 S.W.3d 103, 104–05 (Ark. 2011).  
 19.  Id. at 105.  
 20.  Miller v. State, 63 So. 3d 676, 683 (Ala. Crim. App. 2010), rev’d, Miller v. Alabama, 
132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012). 
 21.  Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2462. 
 22.  Id. at 2463. 
 23.  Id.; ALA. CODE § 13A-6-2(c) (West 1982). 
 24.  Miller, 63 So. 3d at 686, 691. 
 25.  Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Miller, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012) (No. 10-9646), 
2012 WL 588454; Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Miller, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012) (No. 10-
9647), 2012 WL 523347.  The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual 
punishment applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.  Robinson v. 
California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962).  The remainder of this Comment will refer 
exclusively to the Eighth Amendment. 
 26.  Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2455. 
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mandatory sentencing scheme disregards a juvenile’s lessened 
culpability and greater capacity for change, and thus contravenes the 
requirement, established in prior decisions, of individualized 
sentencing for defendants facing the most serious penalties.27  
Accordingly, the Court reversed the sentences and remanded the 
cases for reconsideration by the state trial courts.28 
In the wake of Miller, states that endorsed mandatory life-without-
parole sentences for juvenile homicide offenders will implement 
changes to bring them in compliance with that decision.29  Miller’s 
vague language left many questions unanswered, however, including 
whether the holding should be applied retroactively and which 
sentences judges may legally impose upon juvenile homicide 
offenders.30  Furthermore, Miller does not impose a duty to respond 
on either the legislative or executive branch of government.31  While 
the Court’s decision does not provide guidance for its 
implementation, it does provide a significant impetus to change the 
manner in which the legal system holds juvenile criminals 
accountable for their crimes.  This Comment will argue that states 
should respond to Miller by enacting a juvenile sentencing regime that 
is grounded in the principles and values of restorative justice.32  Such 
a regime should consist of a blended sentencing approach, under 
which juvenile offenders would receive restorative sentences as a 
complement to existing sentencing practices.33 
I.  BACKGROUND 
The Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution 
provides: “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines 
                                                        
 27.  Id. at 2460. 
 28.  Id. at 2475.  In early April 2013, the Arkansas Supreme Court held a hearing to 
consider a re-sentencing request filed on behalf of Kuntrell Jackson.  Hearing Set Over 
Youth’s Life Sentence, COURIER (Mar. 1, 2013), 
http://www.couriernews.com/view/full_story/21856510/article-Hearing-set-over-youths-
life-sentence.  Jackson’s attorneys requested that the supreme court send the case back to 
the circuit court for re-sentencing.  Id.  
 29.  LAVY, supra note 3. 
 30.  Maggie Clark, States Reconsider Juvenile Life Sentences, STATELINE (July 27, 2012), 
http://www.pewstates.org/projects/stateline/headlines/states-reconsider-juvenile-life-
sentences-85899407729 (“The court did not specify whether the rule changes apply to the 
more than 2,500 juvenile life sentences already handed down, or what judges should do in 
the interim before the legislature can offer a new sentencing structure.”). 
 31.  LAVY, supra note 3.  
 32.  See infra Part II.B. 
 33.  See infra Part II.D. 
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imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”34  To 
determine whether a punishment is cruel and unusual, courts should 
not look “through a historical prism,” rather “courts should observe 
the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a 
maturing society.”35  Furthermore, the concept of proportionality is a 
crucial factor in the court’s determination.36 
Two strands of precedent reflect the Court’s concern with 
proportional punishment. First, the Court has prohibited the 
mandatory imposition of capital punishment, requiring that 
sentencing authorities consider the characteristics of a defendant and 
the details of an offense before issuing a death sentence.37  Second, 
the Court has adopted a categorical ban on certain sentencing 
practices based on disparities between the culpability of a class of 
offenders and the severity of a penalty.38  For example, the Court has 
held unconstitutional the imposition of the death penalty for 
nonhomicidal crimes and crimes committed by mentally disabled 
defendants.39  The Court’s decision in Miller represents the 
confluence of these two strands of precedent.40 
A.  The Eighth Amendment Prohibits the Mandatory Imposition of 
Capital Punishment 
In the first line of cases, the Court has demanded individualized 
sentencing when imposing the death penalty.  In Woodson v. North 
Carolina,41 the Court held unconstitutional a statute mandating a 
death sentence for first-degree murder because it precluded 
consideration of “mitigating factors,” such as the personality and 
criminal record of the defendant, as well as the circumstances under 
                                                        
 34.  U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.  
 35.  Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2463 (2012) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 36.  130 S. Ct. 2011, 2021 (2010).  As prior case law explains, the Eighth Amendment’s 
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment “guarantees individuals the right to not 
be subject to excessive sanctions.”  Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 560 (2005).  That 
right derives from the “precept of justice that punishment for crime should be graduated 
and proportioned” to the offense.  Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367 (1910). 
 37.  See infra Part I.A. 
 38.  See infra Part I.B. 
 39.  See Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008) (referring to nonhomicidal crimes); 
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (referring to mental disability). 
 40.  See infra Part I.C. 
 41.  428 U.S. 280 (1976).  
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which the crime occurred.42  This conclusion was warranted by the 
fact that a death sentence is final and should, therefore, be imposed 
cautiously.43 
Subsequent decisions have elaborated on the requirement that 
capital defendants have an opportunity to provide the judge or jury 
with any relevant mitigating evidence.  For example, in Eddings v. 
Oklahoma,44 the Court held unconstitutional the mandatory 
imposition of the death sentence for first-degree murder where state 
courts refused to consider the particular qualities of youth as 
mitigating evidence in the sentencing process.45  The Court noted 
that “youth is more than a chronological fact”; rather, “[i]t is a time 
and condition of life when a person may be most susceptible to 
influence and to psychological damage.”46  Thus, in addition to the 
chronological age of a minor, the sentencing judge should also 
consider factors such as the minor’s maturity level, emotional 
development, and family history.47 
By contrast, in Harmelin v. Michigan,48 the Court addressed a 
mandatory life-without-parole sentence in a felony drug case and held 
that imposing such a sentence without any consideration of mitigating 
factors in noncapital cases does not violate the Constitution.49  The 
Court reasoned that while mandatory penalties are severe, they are 
not unconstitutional, as they have been imposed consistently 
throughout American history.50  Furthermore, the Court concluded 
that the “individualized capital sentencing doctrine,” applied in 
previous death penalty cases such as Woodson and Eddings, did not 
                                                        
 42.  Id. at 304–05.  The Court was concerned that a sentencing process that neglected 
such factors would treat “uniquely individual human beings . . . as members of a faceless, 
undifferentiated mass . . . .”  Id. at 304.  
 43.  Id. at 305 (“Death, in its finality, differs more from life imprisonment than a 100-
year prison term differs from one of only a year or two.  Because of that qualitative 
difference, there is a corresponding difference in the need for reliability in the 
determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case.”). 
 44.  455 U.S. 104 (1982).  
 45.  Id. at 115–16.  In so holding, the Court distinguished between the admissibility 
and the weight of the evidence: The sentencing judge “may determine the weight to be 
given relevant mitigating evidence,” but he “may not give it no weight by excluding such 
evidence from [his] consideration.”  Id. at 114–15. 
 46.  Id. at 115.  
 47.  Id. at 116.  In Eddings, the mitigating evidence was the defendant’s unhappy 
upbringing and emotional disturbance, including evidence of a turbulent family history 
and beatings by a harsh father.  Id. at 114–16. 
 48.  501 U.S. 957 (1991).  
 49.  Id. at 961, 994–95.  
 50.  Id. at 994–95. 
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apply outside the capital context because of the distinct nature of the 
death penalty.51 
B.  The Eighth Amendment Categorically Prohibits Particular Penalties as 
Applied Against Juveniles Because of Their Diminished Culpability 
Courts apply a two-step analysis to determine whether the Eighth 
Amendment categorically prohibits a particular sentence against a 
class of offenders.  First, courts determine “whether there is a national 
consensus against the sentencing practice at issue.”52  This objective 
test looks first to federal and state statutes because legislation is the 
“clearest and most reliable . . . evidence of contemporary values,” and 
then considers sentencing practices.53  Consensus, however, is not 
conclusive, and courts must also use their judgment when 
determining whether the Eighth Amendment categorically prohibits a 
particular sentence.54  Courts are guided by “the standards elaborated 
by controlling precedents and by [their] own understanding and 
interpretation of the Eighth Amendment’s text, history, meaning, and 
purpose.”55  Three principal guiding factors have emerged: (1) “the 
culpability of the offenders at issue in light of their crimes and 
characteristics,” (2) “the severity of the punishment in question,” and 
(3) “whether the challenged sentencing practice serves legitimate 
penological goals.”56 
Several of the cases in this group have specifically focused on 
juvenile offenders because of their diminished culpability.  For 
example, the Court applied the two-step analysis in Graham v. Florida,57 
a case in which Terrance Jamar Graham, a sixteen-year-old boy, was 
found guilty of armed burglary and attempted armed robbery.58  
Graham was sentenced to life imprisonment in Florida, a state that 
had abolished its parole system, effectively leaving Graham with 
executive clemency as his only chance of release.59  On review, the 
Court held that the Eighth Amendment categorically forbids 
sentencing juveniles to life without the possibility of parole for the 
                                                        
 51.  Id. at 995 (internal quotation marks omitted); see supra note 43 and accompanying 
text. 
 52.  Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2022 (2010). 
 53.  Id. at 2023.  
 54.  Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 421 (2012); Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2022. 
 55.  Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 421. 
 56.  Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026.  
 57.  130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010). 
 58.  Id. at 2018, 2020. 
 59.  Id. at 2020.  
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commission of nonhomicide crimes.60  Applying the two-step test, the 
Court first looked to legislation and sentencing practices in 
concluding that a national consensus existed against the sentence 
under consideration.61 
In the second step of its two-step analysis, the Graham Court 
found an independent justification for categorically prohibiting life-
without-parole sentences for juvenile nonhomicide offenders.62  
Regarding the offenders’ culpability, the Court found that 
nonhomicide juvenile offenders had “twice diminished moral 
culpability” due to their age and the nonhomicidal nature of their 
crimes.63  The Graham Court relied on the Roper v. Simmons64 holding 
that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the imposition of the death 
penalty on offenders who were under the age of eighteen when 
committing their crimes.65 
In Roper, the Court established that juveniles are less deserving of 
the most severe punishments than adults because juveniles are 
different from adults in three crucial respects.  First, juveniles have 
“‘[a] lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility,’” 
which “‘often result in impetuous and ill-considered actions and 
decisions.’”66  Second, “juveniles are more vulnerable or susceptible to 
negative influences and outside pressures, including peer pressure.”67  
According to the Court, juveniles experience such vulnerability 
                                                        
 60.  Id. at 2030.  When Graham was decided, there were 123 juvenile nonhomicide 
offenders serving life-without-parole sentences in the United States.  Id. at 2024.  Seventy-
seven of those individuals were serving sentences imposed in Florida.  Id.  The other forty-
six were imprisoned in ten states: California, Delaware, Iowa, Louisiana, Mississippi, 
Nebraska, Nevada, Oklahoma, South Carolina, and Virginia.  Id.  
 61.  Id. at 2026.  Looking to legislative enactments in the United States, the Court 
determined that six jurisdictions did not allow life-without-parole sentences for any 
juvenile offenders; seven jurisdictions permitted life without parole for juvenile offenders 
convicted of homicide crimes; and thirty-seven states, the District of Columbia, and the 
federal government permitted sentences of life without parole for a juvenile nonhomicide 
offender in some circumstances.  Id. at 2023.  Despite the apparent legislative 
endorsement of the sentence, the Court also looked to actual sentencing practices and 
discovered that, of the thirty-nine jurisdictions having statutory authorization to sentence 
juveniles to life without parole for nonhomicidal crimes, only eleven had in fact done so.  
Id. at 2024.  Thus, the Court determined that the imposition of a life-without-parole 
sentence for juveniles was just as infrequent as other sentences deemed unconstitutional.  
Id. at 2025. 
 62.  Id. at 2030.  
 63.  Id. at 2027.  
 64.  543 U.S. 551 (2005).  
 65.  Id. at 578.  
 66.  Id. at 569 (alteration in original) (quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367 
(1993)). 
 67.  Id. 
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because of their general inability to control their surrounding 
environment.68  Third, juveniles’ character and personality traits are 
“more transitory” and “not as well formed” as those of adults.69  
Because juveniles possess these unique characteristics, the Court 
found that they deserve special consideration during the sentencing 
process.70 
Regarding the severity of the punishment, the Graham Court 
noted that life without parole is the “‘second most severe penalty 
permitted by law.’”71  Although the Court conceded that a death 
sentence is “‘unique in its severity and irrevocability,’” it argued that 
life without parole was not unlike death sentences in a number of key 
ways.72  For example, a sentence of life without parole is permanent, 
much like a death sentence, as it precludes the offender’s release 
regardless of subsequent character or behavior improvement.73  
Furthermore, according to the Graham Court, life without parole is a 
particularly harsh sentence for juvenile offenders because they 
ultimately spend more time in prison than would an adult offender 
who receives the same punishment.74 
Finally, relying once more on Roper, the Graham Court reasoned 
that no penological goal justified sentencing juvenile nonhomicide 
offenders to life without the possibility of parole.75  According to the 
Court, the case for retribution was weak because a juvenile 
nonhomicide offender is less culpable than an adult offender, and 
thus should not receive the second most severe sentence as 
punishment.76  Additionally, the Court found that deterrence did not 
justify imposition of the sentence because juveniles’ distinct 
characteristics make them less likely to be deterred from committing 
                                                        
 68.  Id. 
 69.  Id. at 570.  
 70.  Id. 
 71.  Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2027 (2010) (quoting Harmelin v. Michigan, 
501 U.S. 957, 1001 (1991)). 
 72.  Id. (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 187 (1976)). 
 73.  See id. (noting that a life-without-parole sentence “‘means denial of hope; it means 
that good behavior and character improvement are immaterial; it means that whatever the 
future might hold in store for the mind and spirit of [the convict], he will remain in 
prison for the rest of his days.’” (quoting Naovarath v. State, 105 Nev. 525, 526 (1989))).  
 74.  See id. at 2028 (arguing that due to this discrepancy, “[a] 16-year-old and a 75-year-
old each sentenced to life without parole receive the same punishment in name only.”). 
 75.  Id. 
 76.  Id.  This conclusion was warranted because “‘[t]he heart of the retribution 
rationale is that a criminal sentence must be directly related to the personal culpability of 
the criminal offender.’”  Id. (quoting Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 149 (1987)). 
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crime.77  Likewise, the Court found that incapacitation could not serve 
as a justification because it required the sentencing judge to decide 
that the juvenile can never be reformed, a judgment the Court found 
questionable given the characteristics of juveniles.78  Finally, the Court 
found that rehabilitation could not justify a life-without-parole 
sentence for juveniles because such a sentence by its nature implicitly 
rejects the goal of rehabilitation.79 
C.  The Miller Decision Represents the Confluence of the Two Strands of 
Precedent 
In Miller v. Alabama, the Court combined its reasoning from 
these two strands of precedent to hold “that mandatory life-without-
parole sentences for juveniles violate the Eighth Amendment.”80  First, 
the Court noted that while Graham’s categorical ban on life without 
parole was for nonhomicidal crimes, nothing that Graham said about 
children was “crime-specific.”81  The characteristics that make 
juveniles less culpable and less deserving of severe punishment are 
present regardless of the type of crime committed.82  Thus, the 
Graham Court’s reasoning that children are constitutionally different 
for sentencing purposes applies to every juvenile life-without-parole 
sentence, not only those imposed for nonhomicidal offenses.83  
Furthermore, the Court emphasized Graham’s insistence that the 
attributes of youth matter when considering whether life without 
parole is appropriate for a juvenile.84  According to the Court, the 
mandatory penalty schemes in Miller violated the Graham holding 
                                                        
 77.  Id.  Specifically, juveniles’ “‘impetuous and ill-considered actions’” make them 
“less likely to take a possible punishment into consideration when making decisions.”  Id. 
at 2028–29 (quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367 (1993)). 
 78.  Id. at 2029 (“It is difficult even for expert psychologists to differentiate between 
the juvenile offender whose crime reflects unfortunate yet transient immaturity, and the 
rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption.” (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). 
 79.  See id. at 2030 (reasoning that denying the offender the right to re-enter the 
community is an irrevocable judgment that is improper in light of a juvenile’s “capacity for 
change and diminished culpability”). 
 80.  Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2464 (2012). 
 81.  Id. at 2465. 
 82.  See id. (stating that juveniles’ “distinctive (and transitory) mental traits and 
environmental vulnerabilities . . . are evident in the same way, and to the same degree, 
when (as in both cases here) a botched robbery turns into a killing”). 
 83.  Id. 
 84.  Id. 
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because they precluded the sentencing judge from considering such 
attributes before imposing a sentence of life without parole.85 
Second, the Court noted that Graham equated life-without-parole 
sentences to the death penalty, which, in the Court’s opinion, made 
relevant the precedent demanding individualized sentencing in 
capital cases.86  The Court found those cases to emphasize that 
sentencing judges must consider juveniles’ special attributes as 
mitigating evidence before imposing the death penalty.87  Thus, the 
Court noted that “in light of Graham’s reasoning,” the capital cases 
reveal that mandatory life-without-parole sentences, like mandatory 
death sentences, are unacceptable for juvenile offenders.88  The Court 
also rejected the states’ argument that Harmelin forecloses a holding 
that mandatory life-without-parole sentences for juveniles violate the 
Eighth Amendment, as that case did not involve children and its 
holding was not intended to apply to juvenile offenders.89  Ultimately, 
these two strands of precedent led the Court to conclude that a 
sentencing scheme that fails to assess the special characteristics of 
youth before imposing juvenile life-without-parole sentences “poses 
too great a risk of disproportionate punishment” and thus violates the 
Eighth Amendment.90 
II.  ANALYSIS 
States that impose mandatory life-without-parole sentences for 
juvenile homicide offenders will now need to implement new 
sentencing laws that conform to the constitutional requirements set 
forth in Miller.91  While some states have already responded to Miller, 
these responses are inadequate.92  Instead, the appropriate response 
                                                        
 85.  Id. at 2466 (reasoning that the “imposition of a State’s most severe penalties on 
juvenile offenders cannot proceed as though they were not children”). 
 86.  Id. at 2466–67. 
 87.  Id. at 2467 (reasoning that the discussion of youthfulness in Roper and Graham also 
appeared in the capital cases). 
 88.  Id. (arguing that a sentencing judge would be “strictly forbidden” from neglecting 
the differences between adult and juvenile offenders when imposing the death penalty). 
 89.  Id. 
 90.  Id. at 2469.  Because that holding adequately resolved the issue in this case, the 
Miller Court declined to address the question of whether a categorical ban on juvenile life-
without-parole sentences is required under the Eighth Amendment.  Id.  But see Doriane 
Lambelet Coleman & James E. Coleman, Jr., Getting Juvenile Life Without Parole “Right” After 
Miller v. Alabama, 8 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 61, 62 (Special Issue 2012) (arguing 
that the Miller Court should have categorically banned juvenile life-without-parole 
sentences). 
 91.  See infra Part II.A.  
 92.  See infra Part II.A. 
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for all states, including those not affected by the Miller decision, is to 
incorporate a restorative justice sentencing regime into the juvenile 
justice system.93  A basic overview of the regime is necessary to 
understand why restorative justice is the right approach.  Part II.B is 
devoted to describing restorative justice theory, including where and 
how it operates.  Part II.C then explains why the implementation of 
restorative justice sentencing is an appropriate response to Miller 
directly and to juvenile cases in general.  Finally, Part II.D posits that 
to overcome the hurdles of enacting a restorative justice sentencing 
regime through legislation, states should adopt blended sentencing 
models, under which juvenile offenders would receive both a 
restorative and a traditional adult sentence. 
A.  Current State Responses to the Miller Decision Are Inadequate 
Following the Court’s decision in Miller v. Alabama, a common 
issue has arisen in many states across the country: State statutes do not 
provide an alternative sentence now that mandatory life without 
parole is no longer available for juvenile homicide offenders, leaving 
judges with no guidance as to the sentences that are legally 
acceptable.94  In some states, this issue will not be resolved until the 
legislature amends the relevant sentencing statute.95  Legislators in all 
twenty-eight states that had previously endorsed mandatory life-
without-parole sentences for juvenile homicide offenders have said 
that they will consider alternative sentencing laws.96  Until then, 
however, states have demonstrated a variety of potential responses to 
Miller. 
In North Carolina, Governor Perdue signed an amendment to 
the sentencing laws on first-degree murder that mandates life with 
parole if the juvenile is convicted under the felony-murder doctrine.97  
The amendment also outlines the hearing procedure that must be 
used to determine whether a juvenile’s sentence should be life with or 
without parole if the juvenile is not convicted under that doctrine.98  
Mitigating factors to be considered by the court at such a hearing 
include the juvenile defendant’s age, maturity level, mental capacity, 
                                                        
 93.  See infra Part II.B. 
 94.  Scott Michels, A Reprieve for Juvenile Lifers?, CRIME REPORT (July 26, 2012, 5:51 
AM), http://www.thecrimereport.org/news/articles/2012-07-a-reprieve-for-juvenile-lifers. 
 95.  Id. 
 96.  Id.; see also Coleman & Coleman, supra note 90, at 68–75 (suggesting three 
potential legislative responses to the Miller decision). 
 97.  S. 635, 2011th Sess. (N.C. 2012). 
 98.  Id. 
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personal background, prior criminal conduct, and potential for 
rehabilitation.99  The amendment also provides that life with parole 
means that the defendant is eligible for a five-year term of parole after 
a minimum of twenty-five years of imprisonment.100  North Carolina’s 
amendment is consistent with Justice Breyer’s concurrence in the 
Miller opinion.  Justice Breyer maintained that only juveniles who had 
killed or intended to kill another individual could be sentenced to life 
without parole without violating the Constitution.101  North Carolina’s 
response is not comprehensive, however, because it fails to expressly 
address the sentence that should apply to juveniles who are not 
charged under the felony-murder doctrine. 
In Pennsylvania, House Judiciary Committee Chairman Ron 
Marsico introduced an amendment in late September 2012 to the 
sentencing law for juveniles convicted of first- and second-degree 
murder.102  In October, the Pennsylvania General Assembly voted to 
adopt the amendment, which ended the mandatory life-without-
parole sentence for any juvenile convicted of those crimes and 
significantly shortened the applicable sentence.103  Now, when 
considering the appropriate punishment for a juvenile convicted of 
first-degree murder, a judge or jury can still impose a life-without-
parole sentence, but the decision maker also has the option of 
imposing a sentence of thirty-five years to life for a juvenile of at least 
age fifteen, or twenty-five years to life for a juvenile under age fifteen, 
both with the possibility of parole.104  With respect to juveniles 
convicted of second-degree murder, a judge or jury can no longer 
impose life without parole.105  Rather, juveniles between ages fifteen 
and seventeen receive a minimum of thirty years to life, while 
juveniles under age fifteen receive a minimum of twenty years to 
life.106  Although the amendment brings the state into compliance 
                                                        
 99.  Id.  This list of factors is not exhaustive.  The court is free to consider “[a]ny other 
mitigating factor or circumstance” that the defendant or defense counsel may choose to 
present.  Id. 
 100.  Id. 
 101.  Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2476 (2012) (Breyer, J., concurring) (arguing 
that while transferred intent is typically attributed to all participants in felony-murder 
cases, this intent is not sufficient to impose a life-with-parole sentence on a juvenile who 
did not actually kill or intend to kill). 
 102.  Moriah Balingit, Other States Watch How Pennsylvania Handles Life Terms for Juveniles, 
PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Sept. 23, 2012, at A1. 
 103.  S. 850, Reg. Sess. 2011–2012 (Pa. 2012). 
 104.  Id. 
 105.  Id. 
 106.  Id. 
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with Miller, the question remains whether mere compliance is an 
adequate response.  Some commentators have expressed fear that 
judges will continue to impose life-without-parole sentences for 
juveniles, even though, under Miller, these sentences are tolerated 
only in certain circumstances.107  Others view the proposed 
amendment as a “quick fix” to comply with Miller rather than a careful 
reconsideration of how to treat juveniles convicted of serious 
crimes.108 
In Iowa, Governor Terry Branstad has arguably implemented the 
least constructive response to Miller.  While he technically reduced the 
life sentences of thirty-eight homicide offenders who committed their 
crimes as minors, he ordered each offender to serve a mandatory 
sentence of sixty years before being eligible for parole.109  Governor 
Branstad plans to propose a new sentencing law in next year’s 
legislative session that would require a sixty-year minimum sentence 
for juvenile homicide offenders in Iowa.110 
B.  The Appropriate Response to Miller: A Restorative Justice Sentencing 
Regime 
In the wake of Miller, states with criminal statutes that impose 
mandatory life-without-parole sentences for juvenile homicide 
offenders will need to enact sentencing laws that comply with the 
                                                        
 107.  Balingit, supra note 102.  This fear is well-founded given the Miller Court’s 
statement that “appropriate occasions for sentencing juveniles to [life without parole] will 
be uncommon.”  Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2469 (2012). 
 108.  Id.  Marsha Levick of the Juvenile Law Center “th[ought] the Legislature should 
take some time to consider what the alternatives are.”  Id. 
 109.  James Q. Lynch, Trish Mehaffey & Mike Wiser, Branstad Commutes Life Sentences for 
38 Iowa Juvenile Murderers, GAZETTE (July 16, 2012), 
http://thegazette.com/2012/07/16/branstad 
-commutes-life-sentences-for-38-iowa-juvenile-murderers/.  The Iowa Supreme Court heard 
arguments in a case challenging Branstad’s order in early April 2013.  David Pitt, Iowa 
Supreme Court Hears Juvenile Parole Case, SFGATE (Apr. 9, 2013), 
http://www.sfgate.com/news/crime/ 
article/Iowa-Supreme-Court-hears-juvenile-parole-case-4420746.php.  Defense counsel, 
whose client would not be eligible for parole until age seventy-seven, argued that the 
governor’s order was violative of the “spirit or intent” of the Miller decision.  Id.  The 
Assistant Attorney General who represented the state argued that the Miller decision 
requires only the possibility, not the guarantee, of release on parole.  Id.  
 110.  Clark, supra note 30.  Commentators argue that sixty-year sentences are essentially 
“life” sentences for offenders who commit their offenses at the age of thirteen or fourteen.  
Tamar Rebecca Birckhead, States Respond to Supreme Court JLWOP Decision, JUVENILE JUSTICE 
BLOG (July 19, 2012), http://juvenilejusticeblog.web.unc.edu/2012/07/17/states-
respond-to-supreme-court-jlwop-decision/.  Thus, it is possible that long term-of-years 
sentences will be the next issue the Supreme Court addresses within this line of cases. 
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constitutional demands of that decision.111  The appropriate response 
for these—and all—states is to incorporate restorative justice 
sentences into the juvenile sentencing structure.112  According to an 
international advocacy group, “[r]estorative justice is a[n] 
[alternative] theory of justice that emphasizes repairing the harm 
caused or revealed by criminal behaviour.  It is best accomplished 
through cooperative processes that include all stakeholders.”113  The 
remainder of this Section elaborates on the theory of restorative 
justice by discussing its development in the United States and 
abroad114 and describes the four most pervasive restorative justice 
programs in the United States.115 
1.  What Is Restorative Justice? 
Restorative justice is a social reform movement that, since the 
1970s, has steadily gained popularity across the globe.116  It is 
grounded in a theory of justice that emphasizes the repair of harm 
caused by criminal behavior, a process that involves the cooperation 
and involvement of offenders, victims, and their respective 
communities.117  Although disagreement exists as to the precise 
definition of restorative justice,118 Howard Zehr, the leading visionary 
                                                        
 111.  Michels, supra note 94. 
 112.  The Miller decision had no impact on eight states and the District of Columbia, 
which already prohibited mandatory life-without-parole sentences for juveniles.  Liliana 
Segura & Matt Stroud, The Uncertain Fate of Pennsylvania’s Juvenile Lifers, NATION (Aug. 7, 
2012), http://www.thenation.com/article/169268/uncertain-fate-pennsylvanias-juvenile-
lifers#.  Sixteen states, including Maryland, which have sentencing laws that give decision-
makers discretion to impose life without parole for juveniles (as opposed to 
unconstitutional mandatory sentencing laws), can decide whether they want to amend 
their laws in light of Miller.  Id.  For the reasons outlined below, even these states should 
consider enacting a new sentencing regime that incorporates restorative justice sentences. 
 113.  Introduction to Restorative Justice, RESTORATIVE JUSTICE ONLINE, 
http://www.restorativejustice.org/university-classroom/01introduction (last visited Feb. 
14, 2013). 
 114.  See infra Part II.B.1.  
 115.  See infra Part II.B.2.  
 116.  Mark S. Umbreit et al., Restorative Justice in the Twenty-First Century: A Social 
Movement Full of Opportunities and Pitfalls, 89 MARQ. L. REV. 251, 254 (2005). 
 117.  RESTORATIVE JUSTICE ONLINE, http://www.restorativejustice.org/ (last visited Feb. 
14, 2013). 
 118.  John Braithwaite, A Future Where Punishment Is Marginalized: Realistic or Utopian?, 46 
UCLA L. REV. 1727, 1728–29 (1999) (“Restorative justice is a process of bringing together 
the stakeholders (victims, offenders, communities) in a search of justice that heals the hurt 
of crime, instead of responding to hurt with more hurt.”); Lode Walgrave, Restoration in 
Youth Justice, 31 CRIME & JUST. 543, 552 (2004) (“[B]y restorative justice I mean an option 
on doing justice after the occurrence of a crime which gives priority to repairing the harm 
that has been caused by that crime.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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and architect of the restorative justice movement, has provided the 
most succinct definition: “Restorative justice is a process to involve, to 
the extent possible, those who have a stake in a specific offense and to 
collectively identify and address harms, needs, and obligations, in 
order to heal and put things as right as possible.”119  The movement 
has been influenced by the concern for greater rights for crime 
victims, community involvement in the justice system, and decreasing 
recidivism and incarceration rates.120 
Canada, which began using restorative programs in 1974, is 
considered the “birthplace” of the restorative justice movement.121  
Today, however, the movement has resulted in thousands of programs 
across many countries,122 and it has become particularly significant in 
discussions regarding juvenile justice reform.123  Restorative justice 
theory currently influences the juvenile justice systems in New 
Zealand, Australia, Hong Kong, Israel, South Africa, and a large part 
of Western Europe.124 
In the United States, restorative justice has only recently gained 
popularity.125  Restorative justice programs first arose in the late 1970s; 
significant development of these programs, however, did not occur 
until the 1990s.126  Despite the increasing interest in restorative justice, 
it continues to operate primarily on the periphery of the United 
States criminal justice system in small programs run by private 
agencies and churches.127  Most programs are only available to 
                                                        
 119.  Umbreit et al., supra note 116, at 256. 
 120.  DONALD J. SCHMID, RESTORATIVE JUSTICE IN NEW ZEALAND: A MODEL FOR U.S. 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 9 (2001), available at http://www.fulbright.org.nz/wp-
content/uploads/2011/ 
12/axford2001_schmid.pdf. 
 121.  Hon. T. Bennett Burkemper, Jr. et al., Restorative Justice in Missouri’s Juvenile System, 
63 J. MO. B. 128, 130 (2007). 
 122.  Umbreit et al., supra note 116, at 254.  
 123.  Walgrave, supra note 118, at 543–44. 
 124.  Burkemper, supra note 121, at 130.  New Zealand was the first country to enact 
legislation to incorporate restorative justice principles into its juvenile justice system.  Id.  
In 1989, the country passed a law that requires the participation of juvenile offenders in 
family group conferencing, either “as a diversionary measure, or as a prerequisite for the 
judge to sentence the child in youth court.”  Id.  Unfortunately, the sample size is small; 
other than New Zealand, only a few isolated experiments exist.  Walgrave, supra note 118, 
at 577.  
 125.  Christopher D. Lee, Comment, They All Laughed at Christopher Columbus When He 
Said the World Was Round: The Not-So-Radical and Reasonable Need for a Restorative Justice Model 
Statute, 30 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 523, 529 (2011). 
 126.  Burkemper, supra note 121, at 130. 
 127.  Beale, supra note 1, at 413. 
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juveniles convicted of minor, nonviolent, and nonsexual crimes.128  
Moreover, these programs have been unable to substantially influence 
the juvenile justice system because they lack legislative attention and 
financial resources.129  Many state statutes do not reference restorative 
justice at all.130  Others have inserted restorative ideas into the 
purpose clauses of their juvenile justice legislation, but provide no 
specific framework or parameters for the implementation of those 
ideas.131  A few state statutes, however, provide explicit guidelines for 
the establishment of juvenile restorative justice programs.132 
2.  How Does Restorative Justice Operate? 
Restorative justice programs typically fall into one of two 
categories: They provide either restorative processes or restorative 
outcomes.133  A restorative process is one in which the offender and 
the victim, and sometimes community members, work together to 
                                                        
 128.  Leena Kurki, Restorative and Community Justice in the United States, 27 CRIME & JUST.: 
A REVIEW OF RESEARCH 235, 240 (2000).  The use of restorative justice in the United States 
is not nearly as prevalent or as established as it is in other countries around the world.  For 
example, in New Zealand, family group conferencing is used for all juvenile crimes except 
murder and homicide.  Id.  In Germany, approximately seventy percent of adult and 
juvenile cases that used victim-offender mediation in 1995 involved violent crimes.  Id.  In 
Austria in 1996, seventy-three percent of adult cases and forty-three percent of juvenile 
cases that took advantage of some form of restorative justice involved violent crimes.  Id. 
 129.  Amanda L. Paye, Comment, Communities Take Control of Crime: Incorporating the 
Conferencing Model into the United States Juvenile Justice System, 8 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 161, 
163 (1999). 
 130.  Sylvia Clute, Creating Statutes to Deliver Restorative Justice, RESTORATIVE JUSTICE 
ONLINE (July 18, 2011), http://www.restorativejustice.org/RJOB/creating-statutes-to-
deliver-restorative-justice. 
 131.  Walgrave, supra note 118, at 568.  Maryland, for example, utilizes restorative justice 
language in the purpose clause of its state code.  MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-8A-
02 (West 2001).  According to the statute, the juvenile justice system must balance three 
objectives: “(i) [p]ublic safety and the protection of the community; (ii) [a]ccountability 
of the child to the victim and the community for the offenses committed; and (iii) 
[c]ompetency and character development to assist children in becoming responsible and 
productive members of society.”  Id. 
 132.  Clute, supra note 130.  In Colorado, for example, the Children’s Code establishes 
a council to provide assistance and education related to restorative justice programs.  COL. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-2-213 (West 2007).  This council, known as the Restorative Justice 
Coordinating Council, “support[s] the development of restorative justice programs, 
serve[s] as a central repository for information, assist[s] in the development and provision 
of related education and training, and provide[s] technical assistance to entities engaged 
in or wishing to develop restorative justice programs.”  Id. 
 133.  Daniel W. Van Ness & Pat Nolan, Legislating for Restorative Justice, 10 REGENT U. L. 
REV. 53, 54 (1998). 
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resolve the impact of a particular crime.134  Restorative processes 
emphasize dialogue among the parties affected by the crime and 
include mechanisms for communication, such as victim-offender 
mediation, family group conferences, sentencing circles, and 
community reparative boards, among others.135  Restorative outcomes, 
in comparison, constitute the agreements reached after participation 
in a restorative process.136  These agreements might include 
undertakings such as victim support groups, offender rehabilitation, 
and community service activities.137  An ideal restorative justice system 
would include both restorative processes and restorative outcomes.138 
Victim-offender mediation allows victims to reveal how the crime 
has affected them physically, emotionally, and financially, and to 
confront their offender by asking him any questions.139  Likewise, the 
offender has the opportunity to explain how the crime occurred, take 
ownership for his actions, and make amends with the victim.140  
Victim-offender mediation is usually conducted in a structured setting 
with a trained mediator who leads the discussion.141  To qualify for 
victim-offender mediation, the offender must confess and agree to 
participate in the process.142 
                                                        
 134.  UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, HANDBOOK ON RESTORATIVE 
JUSTICE PROGRAMMES 7 (2006), available at 
http://www.unodc.org/pdf/criminal_justice/06-56290_Ebook.pdf. 
 135.  Nancy Rodriguez, Restorative Justice at Work: Examining the Impact of Restorative Justice 
Resolutions on Juvenile Recidivism, 53 CRIME & DELINQ. 355, 357 (2007).  In the United 
States, the most popular restorative justice process is victim-offender mediation.  
Approximately 300 victim-offender mediation programs exist throughout the country, and 
roughly half of these programs deal exclusively with juveniles.  Beale, supra note 1, at 421.  
Family conferencing, sentencing circles, and community reparative boards are also 
frequently utilized in juvenile justice systems.  Rodriguez, supra note 135, at 357–58. 
 136.  UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, supra note 134. 
 137.  Van Ness & Nolan, supra note 133, at 54. 
 138.  Id. 
 139.  Mary Ellen Reimund, The Law and Restorative Justice: Friend or Foe? A Systemic Look at 
the Legal Issues in Restorative Justice, 53 DRAKE. L. REV. 667, 674 (2005). 
 140.  Id. 
 141.  Gordon Bazemore & Mark Umbreit, A Comparison of Four Restorative Conferencing 
Models, JUV. JUST. BULL., Feb. 2001, at 2.  Most victim-offender mediations result in a 
restitution agreement.  Kurki, supra note 128, at 270.  However, the participants do not 
always reach an agreement, as it is “often seen as secondary to emotional healing and 
growth.”  Id.  Victims and offenders alike have reported that the opportunity to express 
their thoughts and feelings is more meaningful than the restitution agreement.  Id. 
 142.  Ilyssa Wellikoff, Note, Victim-Offender Mediation and Violent Crimes: On the Way to 
Justice, 5 CARDOZO ONLINE J. CONFLICT RESOL. 2 (2004).  Some cases are referred to 
victim-offender mediation as an alternative to formal prosecution and punishment.  Other 
cases are referred as part of the offender’s probation or other punishment after formal 
adjudication by the court.  Bazemore & Umbreit, supra note 141, at 2. 
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Family group conferencing is similar to victim-offender 
mediation in that the offender can describe what happened, take 
responsibility for his actions, and understand how those actions have 
impacted both the victim and the community at large.143  It differs 
from victim-offender mediation, however, because it involves a 
broader group of people—family, friends, community members, and 
representatives of the criminal justice system may participate in the 
conference.144  Thus, rather than solely focusing on restoring the 
victim and offender, family group conferences also seek to restore the 
offender’s ties with his community and family.145  Together, this group 
of individuals decides how best to hold the offender accountable.146 
Like family group conferencing, circle sentencing takes a more 
“holistic” approach to restorative justice through its inclusion of all 
those who may be affected by a crime, including the offender, the 
victim, community members, friends, and family.147  These circles 
often also include judges, attorneys, and local law enforcement.148  
These individuals gather in a circle and take turns speaking as they 
pass a “talking piece.”149  The point of these circles is not only 
reparation for the harm caused, but also rehabilitation and re-
integration of the victim and offender into the community.150  As is 
the case with family group conferencing, members of the circle 
determine how the offender should be held accountable for his 
crime.151 
                                                        
 143.  Walgrave, supra note 118, at 572.  A trained facilitator guides the discussion during 
the conference.  Bazemore & Umbreit, supra note 141, at 5.  The offender begins the 
discussion by describing how the crime took place.  Id.  The remaining participants 
respond by describing the impact the crime has had on their respective lives.  Id. 
 144.  Rodriguez, supra note 135, at 357.  Both the offender and the victim can 
recommend who should be invited to participate in the conference.  Bazemore & 
Umbreit, supra note 141, at 5.   
 145.  Lee, supra note 125, at 546. 
 146.  Burkemper, supra note 121, at 129.  After the discussion, the victim typically 
suggests sanctions for the offender, receiving input from the other participants.  Bazemore 
& Umbreit, supra note 141, at 5.  The conference ends when all participants sign an 
agreement outlining the agreed upon sanctions.  Id.   
 147.  Rodriguez, supra note 135, at 357.  In some cases, the judge refers a case to circle 
sentencing, and then uses the resultant agreement as a recommendation during the 
sentencing process.  Kurki, supra note 128, at 281.  In other cases, the judge, prosecutor, 
and defense attorney participate in the sentencing circle, and the agreement reached at 
the circle becomes the offender’s final sentence.  Id. 
 148.  Lee, supra note 125, at 550. 
 149.  Id.  
 150.  Id. at 548. 
 151.  Reimund, supra note 139, at 677.  All circle members participate in the 
development of a sentencing plan for the offender.  Bazemore & Umbreit, supra note 141, 
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Reparative boards bring the offender, and sometimes the victim, 
before a panel of community members who together discuss the 
offender’s crime and the resultant harm to the community.152  The 
panel decides how to address the harm caused by the crime, which 
typically results in a written agreement stipulating that the offender 
will make reparations, often through restitution or community 
service.153 
C.  Why Should States Adopt Restorative Justice? 
States should incorporate concepts of restorative justice into 
their juvenile justice systems for two primary reasons.  First, doing so 
would appropriately address the Supreme Court’s concerns in Miller, 
which include the need to treat juveniles differently from adults for 
sentencing purposes, as well as the need for individualized sentencing 
when imposing life-without-parole sentences on juveniles.154  Second, 
notwithstanding the requirements of Miller, incorporating restorative 
sentences is appropriate because such sentences would supplant the 
current punitive approach to the justice system by emphasizing the 
goals of rehabilitation, restoration, and re-integration. 
1.  A Restorative Sentencing Regime Would Respond to the Supreme 
Court’s Concerns in Miller 
Justice systems are evaluated based on their ability to fulfill 
certain goals or objectives.155  The success of the American criminal 
justice system, for example, has typically been measured by its ability 
to accomplish the goals of retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, 
and rehabilitation.156  In Miller, however, the Court emphasized that 
the distinctive attributes of youth diminish these traditional 
penological justifications for imposing harsh sentences on juveniles, 
                                                        
at 6.  Sometimes the plan requires the justice system, community, or family members to 
take certain actions.  Id.  The process may include secondary circles that monitor 
compliance with that plan.  Id. 
 152.  Rodriguez, supra note 135, at 357.  These community members must receive 
extensive training prior to participating on the board. Bazemore & Umbreit, supra note 
141, at 3. 
 153.  Burkemper, supra note 121, at 129.  The board subsequently monitors the 
offender to ensure compliance with the agreement, and submits a report of its findings to 
the court.  Bazemore & Umbreit, supra note 141, at 4. 
 154.  See supra Part I.C. 
 155.  Paye, supra note 129, at 177–78 (“A successful model of justice is dependent upon 
measuring it against its identified objectives.”). 
 156.  Id. 
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even when they commit terrible crimes.157  Consequently, the Court 
found that none of these goals could justify imposing a mandatory 
life-without-parole sentence on a juvenile homicide offender.158  
Although the Court did not completely foreclose the possibility of 
sentencing juvenile homicide offenders to life without parole, it made 
clear that such a harsh penalty should be uncommon in light of 
children’s diminished culpability and heightened capacity for 
change.159 
If traditional penological goals no longer justify imposition of the 
harshest sentences on juveniles, and if opportunities for imposing 
these sentences after Miller will be limited, it seems appropriate to 
pursue new goals in holding juveniles accountable for their crimes.  
Restorative justice sentences, which emphasize restoration and re-
integration of the offender, provide such alternative goals.  By 
emphasizing restoration and re-integration, restorative justice 
recognizes that juveniles have diminished culpability and increased 
capacity for change, and thus accommodates juveniles better than the 
traditional criminal justice system.  Restorative sentences, as opposed 
to traditional sentences, have a greater positive effect on juvenile 
offenders for three principal reasons.  First, restorative sentences help 
remediate the harm that the offender caused to himself—such as 
social exclusion and stigmatization—if he assumes responsibility for 
the offense and expresses a willingness to accept punishment.160  
Second, restorative sentences have an educational potential that is not 
available with traditional punishment.161  For example, offenders 
often engage in learning experiences, identity building, and social 
integration when restorative sentences are imposed.162  Finally, 
restorative sentences assist the offender, as well as the offender’s 
family, in discovering and acknowledging personal problems that may 
have contributed to the offender’s behavior.163  The benefits of 
restorative sentences, and their ability to accommodate juveniles’ 
                                                        
 157.  See supra Part I.C. 
 158.  See supra Part I.C. 
 159.  Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2469 (2012). 
 160.  Walgrave, supra note 118, at 572 (reasoning that if the offender “‘makes good’ his 
personal life experience,” re-acceptance and re-integration are more likely to result than 
social exclusion and stigmatization). 
 161.  Id. at 572–73 (explaining that restorative sentences can take into account the 
special needs of each particular offender). 
 162.  Id. at 573. 
 163.  Id. (“The conversation in the conference, for example, may make clear that drug 
use is a serious problem or that family conflicts have been dysfunctional to the education 
of children, and it may lead families to accept or seek voluntary welfare assistance.”). 
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special attributes, support the contention that restoration and re-
integration should become the new goals of the juvenile justice 
system. 
Traditionally, sentencing uniformity has been a hallmark of the 
criminal justice system.164  Uniformity, in its basic sense, demands that 
offenders of similar crimes receive similar punishment, while 
offenders of different crimes receive different punishment.165  
Skeptics of restorative justice worry that a restorative regime would 
sacrifice this traditional ideal of sentencing uniformity.166  Yet the lack 
of sentencing uniformity associated with restorative justice is precisely 
why a restorative sentencing regime is an appropriate response to 
Miller.  The Court’s decision in Miller rested primarily on the notion 
that the mandatory imposition of life-without-parole sentences 
precludes a sentencing judge from taking into account a juvenile 
offender’s age, as well as the characteristics and specific circumstances 
that accompany youth.167  The Court expressed a concern with the 
traditional need for sentencing uniformity, noting that under the 
mandatory sentencing schemes at issue, every juvenile homicide 
offender receives the same sentence—“the 17-year-old and the 14-
year-old, the shooter and the accomplice, the child from a stable 
household and the child from a chaotic and abusive one.”168 
Restorative justice addresses this concern because it facilitates 
individualized solutions.169  Communities and victims differ greatly in 
their temperaments, which can lead to varying agreements and 
sentences.170  Although sentencing under a restorative justice regime 
would not obtain uniform results, uniformity must be sacrificed in 
favor of consideration of the variable and rapidly changing 
characteristics of juveniles.  While uniformity must give way to 
individualized solutions, accountability need not: restorative justice 
                                                        
 164.  Beale, supra note 1, at 433. 
 165.  Id. (“Uniformity requires that offenders with similar records, or who have 
committed similar offenses, receive similar punishments.”).  
 166.  See, e.g., Richard Delgado, 52 STAN. L. REV. 751, 759 (2000) (criticizing victim-
offender mediation for producing inconsistent punishments); Beale, supra note 1, at 433 
(arguing that restorative justice is at odds with uniformity).  But see Michael M. O’Hear, Is 
Restorative Justice Compatible with Sentencing Uniformity?, 89 MARQ. L. REV. 305, 308 (2005) 
(arguing that the concern for uniformity is not a compelling reason to reject restorative 
justice). 
 167.  See supra Part I.C. 
 168.  Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2467–68 (2012). 
 169.  See Beale, supra note 1, at 433 (“By emphasizing individualized solutions, 
sentencing under a restorative justice scheme would not have uniform results.”). 
 170.  Lee, supra note 125, at 567. 
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sentences would require the offender to assume responsibility for his 
actions and make amends for the resultant harm to the victim and the 
larger community. 
2.  A Restorative Sentencing Regime Would Re-Orient the Juvenile 
Justice System 
A restorative justice sentencing regime is also an appropriate 
response generally because restorative justice provides a way of 
thinking about crime, and particularly how to hold juvenile offenders 
accountable for their crimes, that is distinct from the current punitive 
approach.171  In our juvenile justice system, as in the justice system as a 
whole, the justification for holding offenders accountable is 
significantly linked to the concept of retribution.172  By violating the 
law, offenders become liable to society and cannot be held 
accountable until they have been appropriately punished.173  In a 
retributive system, “the state” is the victim of the crime and, 
consequently, is responsible for determining how to hold offenders 
accountable for their crimes.174  The actual crime victim is the 
secondary victim, and generally maintains no legal standing in the 
proceedings against the offender.175  Accordingly, “[t]he resulting 
criminal justice system is almost entirely offender driven.”176 
Restorative justice, by comparison, “provides a uniquely different 
orientation to the administration of justice,” by including offenders, 
victims, and community members in a collective response to crime.177  
A restorative form of accountability empowers offenders to assume 
direct responsibility in making amends to the victims they have 
harmed, not to an abstract “state.”178  Offenders actively repair the 
                                                        
 171.  SCHMID, supra note 120, at 6. 
 172.  Mark S. Umbreit, Holding Juvenile Offenders Accountable: A Restorative Justice 
Perspective, 46 JUV. & FAM. CT. J. 31, 31 (1995). 
 173.  Id. 
 174.  See Umbreit et al., supra note 116, at 254 (explaining that the criminal justice 
system focuses on state interests, which include accountability and punishment). 
 175.  Id. 
 176.  Id. 
 177.  Rodriguez, supra note 135, at 355.  According to the legal philosopher Conrad 
Brunk, the differences between a retributive and restorative system should not be 
overstated.  Umbreit et al., supra note 116, at 257.  Brunk argues that retribution and 
restoration are not entirely antagonistic; rather, both seek to hold an offender accountable 
for his crime through a punishment that is roughly proportional to that crime.  Id.  Where 
they differ significantly is in how to “even the score.”  Id. (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 178.  Umbreit, supra note 172, at 31. 
 44 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW ENDNOTES [VOL. 72:21 
harm they have caused, rather than passively accept punishment.179  In 
a restorative system, “crime is defined by the harm it causes and not 
by its transgression of a legal order.”180  The victim also plays a primary 
role in resolving the conflict.181  Restorative justice focuses on 
providing assistance to victims, with the ultimate goal of successfully 
re-integrating the victims and the offenders into the community.182 
States should not implement a restorative justice sentencing 
regime for juveniles simply because it is distinguishable from our 
current juvenile justice system.  Rather, states should implement such 
a regime because it would accomplish the original, and seemingly 
abandoned, rehabilitative goals that governed the juvenile justice 
system prior to the adoption of a punitive ideology in the late 1980s 
and 1990s.183  Additionally, a restorative sentencing regime would 
broaden the rehabilitative ideology to include restoration and re-
integration, and hold juveniles more accountable for their actions.  
Therefore, a restorative sentencing regime would simultaneously 
emphasize rehabilitative goals and respond effectively to youth crime, 
a concern that motivated the shift towards a punitive juvenile justice 
system.184 
Restorative justice is guided by three distinct principles, which 
make it a rehabilitative, restorative, and re-integrative process not only 
for the offender, but also for the victim and the community at large.  
First, restorative justice aims to hold offenders accountable by helping 
them to comprehend and compensate society for the consequences of 
their actions.185  Restorative justice amends harm caused to the victim, 
the offender, and their respective communities.186  By involving 
offenders in the process of resolving the crime, they are enabled to 
                                                        
 179.  Id. 
 180.  Reimund, supra note 139, at 671 (internal quotations marks omitted). 
 181.  Umbreit et al., supra note 116, at 255. 
 182.  Van Ness & Nolan, supra note 133, at 53. 
 183.  Beale, supra note 1, at 413. 
 184.  See Gail B. Goodman, Comment, Arrested Development: An Alternative to Juveniles 
Serving Life Without Parole in Colorado, 78 U. COLO. L. REV. 1059, 1093 (2007) (arguing that 
the inclusion of restorative sentences “advances the rehabilitative goals of the juvenile 
court system while addressing society’s concern that the juvenile justice system is too 
lenient on young, violent offenders”). 
 185.  Paye, supra note 129, at 165. 
 186.  Rodriguez, supra note 135, at 356. 
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accept responsibility for their actions.187  Once they accept full 
responsibility, they can be re-integrated into the community.188 
Second, restorative justice involves victims by giving them a voice 
in the adjudication process.189  In the traditional criminal justice 
system, “[i]ndividual crime victims are left on the sidelines of justice, 
with little or no input.”190  Restorative justice, by comparison, 
encourages victims to become actively involved in resolving the 
crime.191  In most cases, victims meet with their offenders face to face 
and engage in dialogue that addresses the impact of the crime and 
how to repair the resultant harm.192  When victims have the 
opportunity to work through the effects of the crime, they are 
generally better able to forgive their offenders, allowing the re-
integration process to begin.193 
The final goal of restorative justice is to make communities safer 
by attacking, and hopefully preventing, the commission of violent 
crime.194  Crime harms not only the individual victim, but also the 
larger community.  Harm caused to the community must therefore be 
redressed as well.195  To do so, restorative practices involve the 
community in the adjudication process.196  Community members 
provide assistance in the resolution process by suggesting ways in 
                                                        
 187.  Paye, supra note 129, at 165. 
 188.  Id. at 165–66.  In comparison to incarceration, restorative justice programs have 
produced lower rates of recidivism, and thus more successful re-integration.  A U.S. study 
compared one-year re-offense rates among 1,300 juveniles, and determined that those 
juveniles who had participated in victim-offender mediation were approximately one-third 
less likely to commit another offense than those juveniles who had not.  Burkemper, supra 
note 121, at 129.  Less than one in five (eighteen percent) of the juveniles who 
participated in victim-offender mediation committed a crime within a year, as compared to 
more than one in four (twenty-seven percent) of those juveniles who did not participate.  
Id.  Furthermore, the juveniles who participated in victim-offender mediation and re-
offended within the year were involved in less serious crimes than those who did not 
participate.  Id. 
 189.  Paye, supra note 129, at 166. 
 190.  Wellikoff, supra note 142. 
 191.  Umbreit et al., supra note 116, at 255. 
 192.  Id. at 269. 
 193.  Paye, supra note 129, at 166. 
 194.  Id. 
 195.  Lee, supra note 125, at 532. 
 196.  Paye, supra note 129, at 166.  Proponents of the restorative justice framework have 
not reached a consensus on what constitutes a “community.”  Rodriguez, supra note 135, at 
358.  While some researchers endorse a narrow conception of community that includes 
only family and friends, others view a community more broadly and include family, 
friends, juvenile justice professionals, and community volunteers.  Id. 
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which the offender can compensate the victim and subsequently re-
enter society.197 
D.  How Can States Implement a Restorative Justice Sentencing Regime? 
In response to Miller, all states should enact laws that incorporate 
restorative sentences into their juvenile justice systems.  Such 
legislation should not merely include restorative language in its 
purpose clause or authorize the imposition of restorative sentences.  
Rather, this legislation should mandate the development of 
restorative sentences and provide the specific framework and 
parameters for their implementation.  Since an immediate overhaul 
of the existing juvenile justice system is not feasible, states can take an 
initial step by enacting legislation that uses restorative sentencing as a 
complement to existing sentencing practices, especially for offenders 
of violent crimes.198  This complementary system should be achieved 
through the enactment of state sentencing laws that provide for 
“blended sentences.” 
There are five blended sentencing models that judges can utilize 
when sentencing juveniles.199  Three of the five approaches permit the 
juvenile court to assert jurisdiction over a juvenile’s case: The 
“juvenile-exclusive” model allows the judge to impose either a juvenile 
sentence or an adult sentence; the “juvenile-inclusive” model allows 
the judge to impose both a juvenile and an adult sentence; and the 
“juvenile-contiguous” model allows the judge to impose a sentence 
that begins in the juvenile system and transfers to the adult system 
once the juvenile reaches the age of majority.200  Adult courts have 
jurisdiction over a juvenile’s case under the final two approaches: The 
“criminal-exclusive” model allows the judge to choose between 
imposing a juvenile or an adult sentence and the “criminal-inclusive” 
                                                        
 197.  Rodriguez, supra note 135, at 358. 
 198.  See Wellikoff, supra note 142 (arguing that while victim-offender mediation 
involving less serious crimes could be used appropriately as an alternative to the 
prosecutorial system, mediations involving more violent crimes should be held in 
conjunction with the prosecutorial system). 
 199.  See Goodman, supra note 184, at 1091. 
 200.  FRED CHEESMAN, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, A DECADE OF NCSC RESEARCH 
ON BLENDED SENTENCING OF JUVENILE OFFENDERS: WHAT HAVE WE LEARNED ABOUT 
“WHO GETS A SECOND CHANCE?” (2011), 
http://www.ncsc.org/sitecore/content/microsites/future-trends-2011/home/Special-
Programs/4-4-Blended-Sentencing-of-Juvenile-Offenders.aspx.  Under the “juvenile-
inclusive” model, the second (adult) sentence is normally suspended or stayed, and is 
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states within the United States currently employ some form of blended sentencing.  Id. 
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model allows the imposition of both a juvenile and an adult 
sentence.201 
The most appropriate way to blend restorative sentences with 
existing sentencing practices is through the “juvenile-inclusive” 
model.  Under this sentencing scheme, juvenile offenders would 
receive both a restorative sentence and a suspended adult sentence.202  
The offender would begin his restorative sentence in a juvenile 
facility, where he would have access to educational and rehabilitative 
services.203  Once the offender reaches the age of majority, the court 
would determine whether he should be re-integrated into society or 
transferred to the adult system where he would serve the rest of his 
sentence.204  Such a system would hold juvenile offenders accountable 
for their crimes, while also giving them another chance at life outside 
of jail.205  A second, but less effective, way that restorative sentences 
could be blended with existing sentencing practices is through the 
“criminal-inclusive” model, which was recently employed in a first-
degree murder case in Florida.206  Under traditional Florida law, the 
offender would have been sentenced to a mandatory life sentence, or 
possibly the death penalty.207  Instead, after participation in a lengthy 
and painstaking victim-offender mediation conference, the 
prosecutor offered the offender the choice between a twenty-year 
prison sentence plus ten years of probation or a twenty-five-year 
prison sentence.208  The ability to reduce the adult sentence after 
                                                        
 201.  Goodman, supra note 184, at 1092. 
 202.  See id. (urging the Colorado legislature to adopt the “juvenile-inclusive” model). 
 203.  Id. 
 204.  Id. 
 205.  See id. at 1092–93 (“Because blended sentencing requires juvenile offenders to 
make decisions that will have a significant impact on their futures, this model forces 
violent adolescents to alter their thought processes so they are capable of considering the 
long-term consequences of their behavior.”). 
 206.  Paul Tullis, Forgiven, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Jan. 6, 2013, at 28.  Although either 
approach to blended sentencing would be appropriate, the first approach is favorable 
because it is more embracive of the restorative justice ideology.  Under the first approach, 
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lawfully among the larger community upon reaching the age of majority.  Thus, the 
primary focus of this approach is restoration and reintegration.  By affording him this 
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juveniles’ diminished culpability and heightened capacity for change.  Under the second 
approach, however, the juvenile offender only has the opportunity for restoration and re-
integration after he has lived nearly a quarter of his life in prison. 
 207.  Id. 
 208.  Id.  Although this case involved a nineteen-year-old rather than a juvenile, it 
demonstrates that restorative justice can be effectively incorporated into the traditional 
criminal justice system. 
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successful completion of a restorative sentence could also prove a 
viable option for incorporating restorative justice into the juvenile 
justice system. 
An issue with adopting restorative justice legislation is deciding 
whether restorative justice should constitute an entirely new system of 
justice, or whether restorative justice should operate in conjunction 
with the existing justice system.209  As one commentator has shrewdly 
noted, “[n]o one has a magic wand to wave that will instantly 
transform the criminal justice system into a restorative one.”210  
Blended sentencing addresses this concern by imposing restorative 
sentences as a complement to existing sentencing practices. 
Another hurdle associated with adopting restorative justice 
legislation is that most restorative justice programs in the United 
States are available only to juveniles who commit nonviolent crimes.211  
Critics of restorative justice argue that restorative sentences are 
inappropriate for juvenile offenders who commit violent crimes 
because such offenders only respond to deterrence and 
punishment.212  This opinion is untenable, however, particularly 
because it blindly imposes judgment upon all juvenile offenders.213  
Even offenders who commit violent crimes can feel remorse, express 
willingness to repair the harm they caused their victims, and are 
therefore suitable candidates for restorative justice sentences.214  
Restorative sentences are also more demanding than traditional 
sentences, making them a credible response to violent crime.215  Some 
victim-offender mediation programs in the United States have already 
extended their services to offenders of serious crimes such as 
homicide, sexual assault, and armed robbery.216  Blended sentencing 
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is the right means to transition the country toward enacting 
restorative justice legislation that includes all juvenile offenders, even 
those who commit violent crimes.  Implementing this model of 
sentencing would pacify the concerns of critics because violent 
offenders would receive both a restorative and a traditional sentence. 
III. CONCLUSION 
In Miller v. Alabama, the Court combined two strands of 
precedent to hold that mandatory life-without-parole sentences for 
juveniles violate the Eighth Amendment.217  The decision has forced 
many states to re-evaluate the way in which they hold juveniles 
accountable for their crimes.218  Because the Court’s decision was 
vague, states are not confined to any one option when deciding how 
best to reform their juvenile justice systems.219  This Comment argues 
that all states—even those not directly affected by the Miller 
decision—should earnestly consider adopting a restorative justice 
model.220  Restorative justice is an appropriate response to juvenile 
criminal activity because it appropriately accommodates the needs of 
juveniles during the sentencing process and ensures individualized 
sentencing, two concerns that the Court addressed in Miller.221  
Furthermore, it centers the juvenile justice system on a rehabilitative 
ideal, and imposes greater accountability on juvenile offenders by 
encouraging restoration and re-integration.222  States could effectively 
implement a restorative sentencing regime, without completely 
abandoning the traditional criminal justice regime, by adopting a 
blended sentencing approach: Juvenile offenders, including offenders 
of violent crimes, could receive a restorative sentence in addition to a 
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traditional sentence under existing practice.223  The Court’s decision 
in Miller has given states the opportunity to legislate for restorative 
justice within the juvenile justice system.  States should take advantage 
of this opportunity to impose sentences that hold juvenile offenders 
accountable for their crimes, repair the damage caused to the victims, 
and allow the community to participate in the sentencing process. 
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